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2010 Mss Electro-optical Infrared Countermeasures



Other approaches broadcast light energy to confuse the missile infrared sensors. In one example, light energy emitted by non-coherent flashlamps is directed toward the missile sensors, to confuse them and render them ineffective ("jamming"). IR missiles are vulnerable to high-powered IR carrier signals which blind the IR detector of the incoming IR missile. In addition, IR missiles are vulnerable to lower-powered IR carrier signals that are modulated using certain modulating signals that confuse its tracking system and cause the tracking system to track a false target.Conventional countermeasures to an IR missile threat include jamming systems which confuse or blind the IR missile using either IR lamps and/or IR lasers. These jamming systems transmit either a high-powered IR carrier signal to blind the IR detector of the incoming IR missile or transmit a lower-powered IR carrier signal modulated with a modulating signal to confuse the IR detector of the incoming missile.




2010 mss electro-optical infrared countermeasures



BAE Systems' AN/ALQ-212 advanced threat infrared countermeasures (ATIRCM) - part of a directable infrared countermeasures suite - is fielded on U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopters. The suite provides protection against an array of threats, including all infrared threat bands. The AN/ALQ-212 incorporates one or more infrared jam heads to counter multiple missile attacks.


"Electro-optical-infrared is the part of the electromagnetic spectrum between the high end of the far infrared and the low end of ultraviolet. Electro-optical-infrared countermeasure may use laser and broadband jammers, smokes/aerosols, signature suppressants, decoys, pyrotechnics/pyrophorics, high-energy lasers, or directed infrared energy countermeasures."[2]


This paragraph does not control electro-optical, infrared, or terahertz imaging systems: (a) In production, (b) determined to be subject to the EAR via a Commodity Jurisdiction determination, or (c) identified in the relevant Department of Defense contract or other funding authorization as being developed for both civil and military applications.


* (2) Equipment, materials, coatings, and treatments that are specially designed to modify the electro-optical, radiofrequency, infrared, electric, laser, magnetic, electromagnetic, acoustic, electro-static, or wake signatures of defense articles or 600 series items subject to the EAR through control of absorption, reflection, or emission to reduce detectability or observability (MT for applications usable for rockets, SLVs, missiles, drones, or UAVs capable of achieving a range greater than or equal to 300 km, and their subsystems. See note to paragraph (d) of this category).


The missile is fitted with a high-intensity thermal beacon, which provides a long-wave infrared tracking source and a xenon beacon for short-wave tracking. This dual-tracking system provides increased resistance to electro-optical and infrared countermeasures.


Viera joined the Laboratory in 2002 and worked in the Systems and Analysis Group on the Air Vehicle Survivability Evaluation program, simulating, prototyping, and testing advanced infrared IR surveillance systems and seekers for air defense applications. From 2008 to 2010, he served as an assistant leader of the Tactical Defense Systems Group and led field test and evaluation efforts employing the group's ground-based and airborne test beds in the areas of IR system characterization and novel electronic attack testing. In 2010, he joined the Advanced Systems and Capabilities Group as the associate leader to start a new Advanced Concepts and Technology Program supporting U.S. Air Force acquisition through the innovation and development of advanced U.S. systems concepts. From 2012 to 2014, he returned as the leader of the Systems and Analysis Group and started a new Laboratory effort to support Air Force and Department of Defense leadership by providing cross-cutting capabilities analysis and systems trades for the Family of Systems Architecture Engineering program. From 2014 to 2015, he also returned to lead the Advanced Capabilities and Systems Group to work on an array of rapid prototyping efforts in the areas of electronic warfare, force protection, and SIGINT.


Viera's areas of systems analysis and test expertise include electro-optical and IR, RF air defense systems, IR signature phenomenology and countermeasures, electronic attack, multiple-sensor fusion, and defense system architectures.


China has developed military, civilian, and dual-use satellites. Among currently operational satellites, remote-sensing satellites include the Fengyun-1D and -3A weather satellites, capable of visible, infrared, and microwave imaging. Advanced imagery satellites include eight Yaogan/Jianbing high-resolution synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and electro-optical military satellites. China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellites (CBERS)-2 and -2B near real-time electro-optical satellites, with 2.7-meter resolution, are also used for military observation. According to Chinese media, the military now uses such satellites as Beidou-4 and Tianlian-1 for, respectively, positioning and data relay (near-real-time transmission of imagery data from a satellite passing over a target, but not within line of sight of a ground station).3


Inputs from these systems, in turn, could be used to task imaging satellites to search small areas to confirm identification of the carrier strike group. In descending level of utility for maritime target detection, imaging capabilities can be derived from radar, e.g., SAR; and multi- and hyper-spectral, infrared, and electro-optical imaging. China has satellites with all such sensors; SAR in particular offers wide coverage at sufficient resolution (less than 1m in the case of China's Yaogan-6 satellite) to detect a carrier with its large deck-as much as four acres in area-or its wakes (which suggest its speed and direction) under a wide range of conditions. An ASBM could rely on SAR images for cueing, then on SAR for terminal guidance by employing on-board automated target recognition (ATR) software.


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The surveillance and reconnaissance payload capacity is 204kg (450lb) and the vehicle carries electro-optical and infrared cameras and a synthetic aperture radar. The two-colour DLTV television is equipped with a variable zoom and 955mm Spotter, while the high-resolution FLIR has six fields of view ranging from 19mm and 560mm.


When it comes to military aviation, infrared signatures, and being able to accurately measure them, are extremely important. This is especially true when it comes to developing new infrared seekers for missiles and other infrared sensors, as well as countermeasures to those threats. While a certain amount of testing can be done to support these kinds of efforts using ground-based signature measurement systems and development installations, some of which are incredibly complex, there is also a major need to be able to perform this kind of work in the air.


ATIMS III can be carried on a pylon with the turret facing forward or backward, allowing it to best cover the desired aspect range on a target aircraft during a particular test. It is also a highly modular and adaptable design that can gather much more extensive data on a target's infrared signature and how countermeasures, such as infrared jammers or decoy flares, might affect different seeker types. It can be used to test how well new kinds of infrared seekers or sensors spot and track potential targets and how they are impacted by different atmospheric conditions, as well.


It's unclear what the exact data recording system was on the original ATIMS III design, but by this point, it is entirely digital. In 2010, Ampex Data Systems Corporation announced it would "provide a set of four miniR 700 solid-state recorder systems to capture the full spectrum of infrared data measured by the pod" as part of an upgrade program for AICES. The company's press release at the time also indicated that ATIMS III could push at least some of the collected data straight to individuals on the ground via data-link.


When it comes to ATIMS III, the Navy and the Air Force also utilize this pod in support of U.S. allies, including members of NATO, to help with their test and evaluation requirements regarding infrared countermeasures.


For instance, it would be critical to test infrared seekers from weapons like Russia's R-73 and R-27 air-to-air missiles against friendly aircraft and their existing countermeasures in a real-world airborne environment. Evaluating China's rapidly growing missile inventory in a similar manner is perhaps an even more pressing priority. Understanding the unique threat these missiles pose to allied aircraft from all directions and under all conditions is absolutely essential and will spur new countermeasures that might be able to blind, confuse, or otherwise disrupt modern infrared or even multi-mode seeker-equipped guided weapons.


Iran and Syria have also transferred Fateh variants to the Lebanese group Hezbollah. Iranian and Lebanaese sources confirmed these transfers in 2014, though some reports suggest transfers as early as 2007.13 In 2010, Israeli officials also alleged that Syria had transferred M-600 variants of the Fateh to Hezbollah.14 Iran has separately transferred Fateh-110 missiles to proxy groups in Iraq in 2018.15Fateh-110 Anti-Ship VariantsIn 2014, the IRGC displayed two variants of the Fateh missile it called the Hormuz-1 and Hormuz-2. The Hormuz-1 is claimed to have anti-radiation capabilities for attacking radar systems, and in 2014, Iranian television broadcast images of commanders watching an attack on a target with radar antennae. The original claim was that Hormuz-2 was an anti-ship variant, but images of the missile suggested it had a similar radio frequency-transparent radome and not a window for an electro-optical infrared seeker, suggesting it is essentially the same as the Hormuz-1. 16Another anti-ship variant of the Fateh is the Khalij Fars, which does have the electro-optical seeker required to improve accuracy enough to potentially hit a moving target. Tehran claims that early version Khalij Fars entered service in 2008, but was not officially delivered to the Iranian military until a ceremony in March 2014.17 This ceremony featured Fateh missiles painted blue to suggest an antiship variant, but Iran put caps on the noses of the missile preventing verification of the EO/IR seekers. 18 The Department of Defense did assess in the unclassified version of its 2014 report on the military power of Iran that it does possess an antiship ballistic missile capability.19Operational HistoryIran has used the Fateh family of missiles in multiple military operations since 2017. Two of these operations likely included use of some variant of the Fateh-110. In 2018, Iran launched seven missiles at targets in Koya, Iraq, focusing on the headquarters of two Iranian Kurdish parties.20 According to an IRGC statement, Iranian drones supported the attack and provided targeting information. 2ff7e9595c


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